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I. INTRODUCTION
The recent case of Hester International Corporation v. Federal
Republic of Nigeria' revisits the often-debated concept of disregarding
the corporate entity in the context of international trade. Specifically,
the Fifth Circuit's ruling brings into question the standards and proce-
dures used to determine the existence of the -"alter ego status" of a
government-owned corporation of a foreign state.
This note suggests that the U.S. courts should take a broad view
when considering the validity of a corporate entity which is an agent of
a foreign state. Hester illustrates a judicial willingness to apply the do-
mestic principles of corporate law to an inappropriate situation. A thor-
ough analysis of the Nigerian context will demonstrate the distinctive
natures of domestic corporations and Nigerian corporations. Because of
such differences, the ruling in Hester is inherently flawed. Ultimately,
1. 879 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1989).
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the courts should not be as hesitant to "pierce the corporate veil" in the
international context as they traditionally have been in the domestic
sense.
After reviewing the pertinent facts of the Hester case, this note
will briefly discuss the general nature of corporate entities. Thereafter,
the analysis will focus on Nigeria's relationship with its wholly-owned
company vis-a-vis the existing case law on international corporate enti-
ties and the validity of their limited liability status. Finally, the Fifth
Circuit's ruling will be questioned in light of the existing Nigerian
context.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
As part of a continuing program to develop the economic infra-
structure of Nigeria,2 the Hester International Corporation (HIC) en-
tered into an agreement on April 9, 1981 with the National Grains
Production Company, Limited of Nigeria (NGPC)3 and the State of
Cross River4 to implement and develop the Bansara Rice Farm Pro-
ject.' The partnership among HIC, NGPC and Cross River dissolved
when the Nigerian government refused to guarantee a loan to HIC,6
thus prompting a financial crisis and the ultimate abandonment of the
entire project.
HIC brought a breach of contract suit against the Nigerian gov-
ernment on the basis that NGPC was an alter ego or agent of the
Nigerian government and consequently argued that Nigeria was bound
by a provision in the agreement to provide "adequate security" for the
2. See infra note 51 and accompanying text.
3. This company was wholly owned by the Federal Republic of Nigeria and its
Board of Directors was entirely appointed by the Nigerian government. The main ob-
jective of the NGPC was to establish a 4,000 hectare mechanized grain farm in each of
the 19 Nigerian states. P. KOEHN, PUBLIC POLICY AND ADMINISTRATION IN AFRICA 98
(1990) [hereinafter KOEHN].
4. This is a political subdivision of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. NGPC is no
longer an actual party to the appeal before the 5th Circuit, but was nonetheless a
significant presence in determining HIC's frame of mind and the extent, if any, of
Nigeria's participation in the Bansara agreement. Hester, 879 F.2d at 172.
5. The vehicle for this project was a limited liability joint venture (Bansara Rice
Farms, Ltd.) in which NGPC and Cross River each owned 30% of the interest in the
project and HIC owned 40%. Id. at 171.
6. As part of the agreement HIC was obligated to secure all of the off-shore fi-
nancing for the project with the stipulation that the Federal Republic of Nigeria would
provide an adequate guarantee for any such loan. This concession (the guarantee) was
made by NGPC on behalf of Nigeria and did not directly involve the participation of
the Nigerian government itself. Id. at 171-72.
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external financing.'
This case entered the federal arena on diversity grounds, and HIC
made its claim pursuant to the Commercial Activity Exception of the
Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act (FSIA).8 However, the Fifth Circuit
never actually addressed this argument because, in affirming the lower
court's decision, NGPC was deemed to be an independent juridical en-
tity and not an alter ego or instrumentality of the Federal Republic of
Nigeria. Consequently, HIC's claim against Nigeria failed for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction over Nigeria.9
III. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
A. The Nature of the Corporate Entity in General
It is axiomatic that the corporate form is a legally valid enterprise
which inherently enjoys the benefit of limited liability." Not surpris-
7. Id. at 172.
8. 28 U.S.C. §1604 provides:
[Siubject to existing international agreements to which the United States
is a party at the time of the enactment of this Act a foreign state shall be
immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States and of the
States except as provided in sections 1605 to 1607 of this chapter.
28 U.S.C. §1605(a)(2) provides:
[A] foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of
the United States or of the States in any case in which the action is based
upon a commercial activity carried on in the United States by the foreign
state; or upon an act outside the territory of the United States in connection
with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere; or upon an act
outside the territory of the United States in connection with a commercial
activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the
United States.
9. In essence, the 5th Circuit held that Nigeria could not be sued under the Com-
mercial Activity Exception to the FSIA because Nigeria was not a party to the com-
mercial activity in question. It is this point that is questioned by this author's note.
10. "Separate legal personality has been described as an 'almost indispensable as-
pect of the public corporation.' " First National City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio
Exterior De Cuba, 462 U.S. 611, 625 (1983), quoting FRIEDMAN, GOVERNMENT EN-
TERPRISE: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS, IN GOVERNMENT ENTERPRISE: A COMPARATIVE
STUDY, 303, 314 (1970) [hereinafter FRIEDMAN]. "Limited liability is the rule, not the
exception; and on that assumption large undertakings are rested, vast enterprises are
launched, and huge sums of capital are attracted." Anderson v. Abbott, 321 U.S. 349,
362, reh. denied, 321 U.S. 804 (1944). It is important to understand that the concept
of limited liability suggests that the "owners" of a corporation will not be held liable
for the acts of the corporation itself. Applied to the instant case, the 5th Circuit implies
that Nigeria, the sole owner of the corporate enterprise (NGPC), will not be held re-
sponsible for the breach of contract provoked by the NGPC. Hester, 879 F.2d at 181.
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ingly, American courts have traditionally been reluctant to disregard
this notion of limited liability which is derived from the independent
status of the corporate entity." However, when corporations own other
corporations, 2 the basic foundation of limited liability begins to wear
thin. Judicial opinions continually warn against the use of overused
metaphors such as "piercing the corporate veil", "alter ego" status,
"sham corporation" and "mere instrumentality" as a substitute for de-
tailed factual inquiries.'
3
Nevertheless, the corporate form and the companion concept of
limited liability are in no sense absolute. There are three commonly
recognized scenarios in which a private corporation will not be re-
garded as legally separate from its owners. The first such exception is
illustrated by the case of NLRB v. Deena Artware, Inc." in which the
Supreme Court ruled that a corporate entity can be so extensively con-
trolled by its owner that a relationship of principal and agent is thereby
created.' Within such a framework, one party (agent or principal) can
be held liable for the misgivings of the other.' 6
The second exception to the doctrine of corporate entity involves
the equitable principle that the corporate form will be disregarded
11. "This power to pierce the corporate veil, though, is to be exercised 'reluc-
tantly' and 'cautiously' and the burden of establishing a basis for the disregard of the
corporate fiction rests on the party asserting such claim." DeWitt Truck Brokers v. W.
Ray Fleming Fruit Co., 540 F.2d 681, 683 (4th Cir. 1976), quoting Pardo v. Wilson
Line of Washington, Inc., 414 F.2d 1145, 1149 (D.C. Cir. 1969) and County Maid,
Inc. v: Haseotes, 299 F. Supp. 633, 637 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
12. This basically refers to the traditional relationship of a parent corporation and
a subsidiary.
13. Judge Cardozo succinctly described the situation in Berkey v. Third Avenue
Ry. Co., 244 N.Y. 84, 94, 155 N.E. 58, 61 (1926): "The whole problem of the relation
between parent and subsidiary corporations is one that is still enveloped in the mists of
metaphors. Metaphors in law are to be narrowly watched, for starting as devices to
liberate thought, they end often by enslaving it." More than half a century later, Car-
dozo's words maintain an enormous influence in judicial circles. See First City Bank v.
Banco Para El Comercio Exterior De Cuba, 462 U.S. 611, 623: "Justice Cardozo
warned. . .against permitting epithets to substitute for rigorous analysis." See also
Riguelme Valdes v. Leisure Group, Inc., 810 F.2d 1345, 1352 (5th Cir. 1987); United
States v. Jon-T Chemicals, Inc., 768 F.2d 686, 691 (5th Cir. 1985); Ramirez de Arel-
lamo v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500, 1516 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
14. 361 U.S. 398 (1960).
15. "Dominion may be so complete, interference so obtrusive, that by the general
rules of agency the parent will be a principal and the subsidiary an agent." Id. at 403,
quoting Berkey, 244 N.Y. at 95, 155 N.E. at 61. This particular exception necessarily
involves a detailed factual analysis of the relationship between the owners (the alleged
principal) and the corporation (the alleged agent).
16. NLRB v. Deena, 361 U.S. at 403.
HESTER v. FED. REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA
when doing otherwise would result in fraud or injustice. 7 This excep-
tion also requires a thorough investigation of facts on a case-by-case
basis as well as a consideration of the far-reaching implications of rec-
ognizing the corporate entity in a particular situation. Although a court
which is well-versed in the intricacies of a given case is in a far superior
position to make such an analysis, I will attempt to make such an argu-
ment below with regard to the Hester case due to an apparent void in
the Fifth Circuit's opinion. 18
An additional exception, which is typically considered a subset of
the fraud/injustice argument, is that courts will not give effect to a
corporation which is created to defeat public policy.' 9
Finally, the presumption of a corporation's independent status can
be.overcome if the corporate entity is found to be abusing the corporate
form."
B. The Corporate Entity in the Context of International Trade
The landmark Supreme Court case involving corporate instrumen-
talities of a foreign state is First National City Bank v. Banco Para El
Comercio Exterior De Cuba. (Bancec)zl Specifically, this case purports
to set the standard for determining whether a governmental entity is
separate from the government itself. In 1960, the Cuban government
established Bancec as an official institution for foreign trade with full
juridical capacity of its own. While Bancec was attempting to collect
on a letter of credit issued by defendant Citibank, the Cuban govern-
ment seized and nationalized all of Citibank's assets through a "Bank
17. See Taylor v. Standard Gas Co., 306 U.S. 307, 322 (1939); Pepper v. Litton,
308 U.S. 295, 310 (1939). With regard to the latter case, it is important to realize that
the court allowed for equitable subordination on the basis that there was a fraudulent
conveyance made possible by the nature of the corporate form; in such a case there is
no need to even consider an "alter ego" argument since the fraud alone will suffice as a
justification for disregarding the corporate entity.
18. See infra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
19. In Bangor Punta Operations, Inc. v. Bangor & Aroostook R. Co., 417 U.S.
703, 713 (1974), the Supreme Court observed: "Although a corporation and its share-
holders are deemed separate entities for most purposes, the corporate form may be
disregarded in the interests of justice where it is used to defeat an overriding public
policy." See also Anderson v. Abbott, 321 U.S. 349 (1944).
20. See Walkovsky v. Carlton, 18 N.Y.2d 414, 223 N.E.2d 6 (1966) in which the
court suggests that if certain formalities such as the corporate books, bank accounts,
officers and directors, meeting minutes, etc. are used in a peculiar manner, there might
be grounds for disregarding the corporate entity.
21. 462 U.S. 611 (1983).
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Nationalization Law."' 22 Subsequently, when Bancec brought suit
against Citibank on the letter of credit in Federal District Court, Ci-
tibank asserted a right to set off the value of its seized Cuban assets
against the claim. The ultimate issue in the case was whether the acts
and liabilities of the foreign sovereign government of Cuba could be
attributed to the state-owned banking entity, Bancec."3
The Supreme Court ruled that Bancec was not an entity indepen-
dent from the Cuban government. In doing so, the Court outlined the
common features attributed to an ordinary, separate government in-
strumentality, as far as such an ideal can exist. This "Bancec Test" is
as follows: The instrumentality is set up as a separate juridical entity;
The instrumentality is primarily responsible for its own finances; and
The instrumentality is not subject to the same budgetary constraints
with which ordinary government agencies must comply.24
Bancec serves as a model for defining the so-called typical separate
government-owned entity which is afforded a presumption of indepen-
dent status. However, the actual facts of Bancec paint a scenario which
has little in common with the Hester case. The former involves a U.S.
corporation seeking a remedy against a corporation of a foreign state
for actions of the foreign state itself. The latter implicates a breach of
contract remedy against the foreign state (Nigeria) for actions taken
by the state-owned corporation (NGPC).2 5 Nevertheless, Bancec does
reiterate the three general exceptions to the corporate entity doctrine 26
and applies them to the realm of corporations owned by foreign states.
Thus, while Bancec is useful as a starting point to place the Hester
opinion in perspective, consideration of other more recent federal case
law is also necessary to properly analyze the Fifth Circuit's ruling in
Hester.
22. Id. at 614.
23. Hester, 879 F.2d at 177 (construing Bancec).
24. Bancec, 462 U.S. at 624. According to the Court, "[t]hese distinctive features
permit government instrumentalities to manage their operations on an enterprise basis
while granting them a greater degree of flexibility and independence from close politi-
cal control than is generally enjoyed by government agencies. These same features fre-
quently prompt governments in developing countries to establish separate juridical enti-
ties as the vehicles through which to obtain the financial resources needed to make
large-scale national investments." Id. at 624-625.
25. Therefore, the two cases differ not only in terms of the type of action brought
but also in terms of the parties involved in the suit.
26. See supra notes 14-20 and accompanying text.
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IV. ANALYSIS OF THE FIFTH CIRCUIT'S RULING IN HESTER
The Hester case in and of itself does not represent a dramatic shift
in the law of corporations. However, it does serve to magnify the vul-
nerability of the current domestic law in light of the global economic
situation27 and prompts a reexamination of the process courts use to
determine the independent status of a foreign state-owned corporation.
A. Hester's Strict Reliance on Direct Control
The Hester opinion relies on Kalamazoo Spice Extraction Com-
pany v. Provisional Military Government of Socialist Ethiopia (Kal-
Spice)28 as a prime illustration of a situation where a government exer-
cises direct control over an instrumentality so as to preclude the inde-
pendent status of that instrumentality. In 1966, Kal-Spice formed and
incorporated the Ethiopian Spice Extraction Share Company (ES-
ESCO) under the laws of Ethiopia and commenced significant extrac-
tion and trading in the spice industry.2" In 1975, the governmental
party, the Provisional Military Government of Socialist Ethiopia
(PMGSE), expropriated without compensation a substantial portion of
Kal-Spice's stock interest ° in ESESCO and thereby gained majority
control of this entity."' In order to substantiate its claim against
PMGSE (for the expropriation) under the Commercial Activity Excep-
tion of FSIA,' 2 Kal-Spice needed to somehow impute the U.S. contacts
27. Hester is relevant in the sense that the international economic arena is con-
stantly changing and the laws must adapt to reflect these changes: Nigeria, with its 114
million inhabitants, is Africa's most populous nation. Furthermore, it is extremely rich
in natural resources. However, it remains one of the world's poorest nations with a per
capita gross national product of only $308. In fact, Nigeria is one of only 42 countries
considered to be a "low income economy" by the World Bank. Johns, A U.S, Policy For
Nigeria: Supporting Political and Economic Freedom, HERITAGE FOUNDATION RE-
PORTS, No. 730 at 1 (1989). Given Nigeria's recent attempt to bridge the gap between
its wealth of natural resources and the poverty of its population (see infra note 51 and
accompanying text), our legal system should look to help, rather than hinder, such
mutually beneficial investment opportunities between the U.S. and Nigeria.
28. 616 F. Supp. 660 (D.C. Mich. 1985).
29. Id. at 661.
30. Up until this point, Kal-Spice owned 80% of this stock and exerted control
over the operation of the company. Id. It was estimated that Kal-Spice's stock interest
had been reduced from 80% to 40% by virtue of the government's expropriation de-
cree. Id. at 662.
31. Although PMGSE was purported to have obtained only 51 % of the stock,
Kal-Spice alleged that without majority ownership and control, its stock would be vir-
tually worthless. Id. at 663.
32. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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of ESESCO to PMGSE, the named defendant. 33 Consequently, the
Federal District Court of Michigan had to determine whether PMGSE
exerted sufficient control over ESESCO so as to overcome the presump-
tion of ESESCO's independent status.
The Kal-Spice court had no difficulty finding that PMGSE exer-
cised sufficient control over ESESCO, thus negating its, independent
status. Specifically, the Kal-Spice court articulated the following ele-
ments which constituted such direct control: PMGSE appointed a ma-
jority of the board of directors; PMGSE required that all checks in
excess of $25,000 be signed by one of these government appointed di-
rectors; the Ministry of National Resources Development, the govern-
mental agency assigned to supervise ESESCO, approved all invoices for
shipments exceeding $13,000; and several ESESCO invoices for ship-
ments contained the seal of PMGSE.34 After considering these factors
in aggregate, this court concluded that the independent status of ES-
ESCO should be disregarded and that Kal-Spice could impute the ac-
tivities of ESESCO in the United States to the Ethiopian government
so as to give Kal-Spice a viable medium for litigating its claim against
PMGSE for expropriating the stock.3 5
Kal-Spice serves as a model for analyzing whether government
control of an instrumentality is so extensive as to overcome the pre-
sumption of that instrumentality's independent status. Although the
Nigerian government did not necessarily exhibit the requ-isite control
over the day-to-day operations of the NGPC in the instant case,36 it is
arguable that a strict adherence to the Kal-Spice formula is both inap-
propriate and counterproductive. In essence, direct management of
daily corporate operations is not the only way for a foreign state to
exert "control" over an instrumentality. A thorough analysis of the to-
tality of the circumstances of the instant case reveals such alternative
possibilities of inferring control.
B. Equitable Principles and the FSIA
In reference to Nigeria's 100% ownership of NGPC, the Fifth
33. Kal-Spice, 616 F.Supp. at 666.
34. Id.
35. "To continue to recognize the separate legal status of ESESCO under these
circumstances would insulate the PMGSE from liability for its expropriation of Kal-
Spice's property interest in ESESCO while permitting the PMGSE, through ESESCO,
to profit from its commercial activities in the United States." Id. Therefore, in addition
to the primary argument that PMGSE exerted sufficient control, this case also involves
a consideration of avoiding injustice or inequity.
36. Hester, 879 F.2d at 181.
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Circuit in Hester was over-anxious in accepting the Eleventh Circuit's
somewhat analogous ruling in Hercaire International, Inc. v. Argen-
tina3 7 without performing a substantive analysis of the issues presented
in Hester. Because Hercaire is nothing more than persuasive law38 , it
behooves the Hester court to give equal consideration to the arguments
articulated by the Hercaire trial court.39 In light of the specific condi-
tions implicated in Hester, the principles espoused by the Hercaire
lower court should be applied so as to elicit a more equitable result.
In Hercaire, an American corporation (Hercaire) sought the exe-
cution of a judgment received against Argentina for a breach of con-
tract. In an attempt to collect on its judgment, Hercaire seized an air-
craft which was owned by Aerolineas Argentina, a corporation wholly
owned by Argentina. 0 The central question, as posed by the Eleventh
Circuit, was whether the assets of this foreign state's wholly-owned na-
tional airline were subject to execution to satisfy a judgment against
the foreign state, even though the airline was not a direct party to the
litigation and was not involved in the breach of contract underlying the
litigation.4
The lower court considered a broad range of sources in finding
that Aerolineas was not to be afforded separate juridical existence for
the purposes of the judgment in question. The lower court first consid-
ered that various agencies and instrumentalities of foreign states have
been recognized under FSIA as part of the foreign state itself.4 2 As
emphasized by the Hercaire lower court, this often works to the advan-
tage of the state-owned instrumentality in the sense that courts will
shield these foreign agencies from harm by including them within the
definition of a foreign state so as to invoke sovereign immunity. 43 It
would be a serious violation of equitable principles to allow the agen-
cies of a foreign state to use this "shield" only when it works to their
37. 821 F.2d 559 (11th Cir. 1987).
38. Eleventh Circuit law is not binding in the Fifth Circuit.
39. 642 F. Supp. 126 (S.D. Fla. 1986).
40. This fact, first noted by the trial court at 642 F. Supp. 128, was undisputed by
all the parties.
41. Hercaire, 821 F.2d at 559. The actual breach of contract involved military
parts supplied to Argentina during the Falkland War Crisis in 1982. Id. at 560.
42. Arango v. Guzman Travel Advisors Corporation, 621 F.2d 1371 (5th Cir.
1980) found that an airline which was completely owned by the Dominican Republic
was actually a foreign state. This argument is even more relevant to Hester because
Fifth Circuit law is binding on this court.
43. Hercaire, 642 F. Supp. at 130. See also Alberti v. Empresa Nicaraguese De la
Carne, 705 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1983); Carey v. National Oil Corporation, 592 F.2d 673
(2d Cir. 1979).
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advantage, but to disregard it when it hinders their interests."
Secondly, the trial court in Hercaire pointed out that the actual
text of FSIA4 5 defines a foreign state as incliding "an agency or instru-
mentality that is an organ of a foreign state or a majority of whose
shares is owned by the foreign state."'4 6 The Hercaire trial court con-
cluded that since Argentina owned all the shares of Aerolineas, the lat-
ter's assets were those of Argentina.4 7
In reversing the District Court, the Eleventh Circuit in Hercaire
bases its entire argument on the Bancec model of a typical instrumen-
tality as well as the common exceptions.4 As previously discussed, this
is a somewhat limited model which should be used only as a starting
point and is in no way intended to be an exhaustive list. 9 In effect, the
Eleventh Circuit erred when it refused to address these valid arguments
made by the Hercaire lower court and effectively ignored the actual
text of FSIA in making its decision. Likewise, the Fifth Circuit has
erred by strictly relying on Hercaire to dismiss the issue of Nigeria's
100% ownership of NGPC.5 °
44. "It would be unfair to allow agencies to remove the statutory cloak when they
find it convenient, and then to replace it when the weather once again turns foul. Statu-
tory garb is permanent. This Court considers an agency or instrumentality of a foreign
state as the foreign state itself for all purposes under the FSIA." Hercaire, 642 F.
Supp. at 130.
45. HIC brought its claim under FSIA, and the Fifth Circuit maintained that
they did not reach this argument because HIC failed to prove that NGPC was an
agent of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Nevertheless, the text of FSIA itself can be
used as an aid in determining agency or alter ego status.
46. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1603(b)(1) and (2).
47. Hercaire, 642 F. Supp. at 130.
48. See supra notes 24 and 26 and accompanying text.
49. The Bancec court stated:
Our decision today announces no mechanical formula for determining the cir-
cumstances under which the normally separate juridical status of a govern-
ment instrumentality is to be disregarded. (footnote omitted) Instead, it is the
product of the application of internationally recognized equitable principles to
avoid the injustice that would result from permitting a foreign state to reap
the benefits of our courts while avoiding the obligations of international law.
Bancec, 462 U.S. at 633-634.
50. The courts generally agree that.one-hundred percent ownership is an insuffi-
cient basis for applying the alter ego theory to pierce the corporate veil in the domestic
context: "Alter ego status is tautological with actual control of the subservient entity.
Unrestricted ownership of that entity provides a logical backdrop for domination, al-
though ownership alone will not support alter ego finding." Riguelme, 810 F.2d at
1354. See also John-T Chemicals, 768 F.2d at 691. However, specific factors in foreign
nations such as Nigeria tend to limit the application of this legal principle.
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C. A Consideration of Nigeria's Socio-Economic Framework
While this note does not advocate a full reversal of the traditional
approach of sovereign immunity and the presumption of independent
status of foreign state-owned corporations, it does question the extreme
amount of deference given to the sovereign government in Hester. Spe-
cifically, Nigeria's legal structures have been accorded full recognition
and validity even though a thorough investigation of the conditions pre-
sent in Nigeria raises serious questions which would affect this ruling.
One fact that must be considered is that Nigeria is a relatively
underdeveloped country seeking to enter the realm of modern industry
and international trade. For example, the current government of Nige-
ria has maintained a strong effort to utilize American capital and tech-
nology in developing its agricultural economy. A 1980 meeting between
then Vice-President Walter Mondale and top Nigerian officials resulted
in a bilateral agreement which called for cooperative governmental ef-
forts to expand agricultural trade and encourage and facilitate partici-
pation by American private businesses in joint farming ventures in Ni-
geria (such as the Bansara Rice Farm).51
While the collective aspirations of this nation are understandable
and admirable, we must be careful not to take anything for granted in
analyzing the economic, corporate and governmental structures of a na-
tion in such a rudimentary stage of development.52 Consequently, any
direct comparison to domestic American government-corporate rela-
tionships is inherently flawed and unacceptable. The facts of Hester
should be analyzed within the context of the Nigerian socio-economic
framework, 53 and then the appropriate law should be applied to such
facts.54 The distinct nature of Nigerian legal-corporate relationships
places the instant case beyond the realm of traditional domestic corpo-
rate law. Specific conditions prevailing within Nigeria, especially with
regard to corruption, justify a reconsideration of the status-quo mental-
ity exhibited by the Hester court.
In deciding on NGPC's status (independent or not), the Fifth Cir-
51. KOEHN, supra note 3, at 99. This cooperative accord reflected a possible at-
tempt to extend the previous political relationship of the two countries to the economic
and financial fields. NIGERIAN FOREIGN POLICY, ALTERNATIVE PERCEPTIONS AND
PROJECTIONS 47 (T. Shaw and 0. Aluko eds. 1983).
52. See supra note 27.
53. See infra note 66 and accompanying text.
54. As indicated by the Fifth Circuit, the appropriate law to be applied is that of
American and international law and not that of the chartering state. Hester, 879 F.2d
at 177.
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cuit fell into the same trap as did the lower court 55 - they utilized the
domestic corporate context where it had no application. 5 For instance,
the Fifth Circuit alludes to the trial court's finding that NGPC's gov-
ernment-owned stock was available for public purchase. 57 However,
they did not consider what meaning, if any, this had in the Nigerian
context. Was there actually a viable market facility for such securities?
Were there willing buyers? Or was this merely a facade used to protect
the Nigerian government by setting up a corporate shell? Although
these questions are not easily answered, the courts are nevertheless ob-
ligated to consider such pertinent background information. In all
probability, the stock was not readily available for public purchase. The
susceptibility of the Nigerian marketplace to unscrupulous manipula-
tion is well-documented. 58 Furthermore, the ominous level of poverty in
Nigeria dispels the notion of a "public market" for corporate stock.59
Thus, the Hester court's conclusion that HIC properly maintained its
independent status from Nigeria is significantly weakened.
The Fifth Circuit in Hester also misconstrued the finding of fact
that NGPC's 200 employees were not employees of Nigeria and were
not bound by the civil service rules and regulations."0 This "fact" is
misleading in the Nigerian context. Unlike the established legal-gov-
ernmental structures which are in place in the United States, the situa-
tion in Nigeria tends to be extremely informal. Personal contacts in
Nigeria play a significant role in work efficiency and career success.6"
Administrative affairs are greatly influenced by personal preferences,
loyalty considerations and face-to-face interactions.6 2 Significant ad-
ministrative decisions are frequently made on an ad hoc basis without
use of written documentation.6 3 Such a climate gives rise to suspicion
with regard to the allegedly separate status of the Nigerian government
and parastatal corporations such as NGPC. Within such an informal
framework, the American perception of the "corporate" entity and all
of its implications has little, if any, significance.
Neither the lower court nor the Fifth Circuit took the differences
55. 681 F. Supp. at 371. The lower court found "that the exhibits do not establish
an alter ego or agency relationship between Nigeria and NGPC, with regard to the
issue of attribution of liability among entities of a foreign state." Id.
56. See infra note 71.
57. Hester, 879 F.2d at 179.
58. KOEHN, supra note 3, at 122.
59. See supra note 27.
60. Hester, 879 F.2d at 179.
61. KOEHN, supra note 3, at 22.
62. Id.
63. Id.
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between Nigeria and the U.S. into consideration when applying the law
to Hester. On the contrary, they erroneously presumed the existence of
"American-type" corporate-legal structures in Nigeria. While they
have succeeded in maintaining the status quo and preserving the tradi-
tion of sovereign immunity and independent corporate status, these
courts have committed a grave mistake. In short, the American courts
are far too anxious to transfer the domestic reluctance to "pierce the
corporate veil" to the international scene. Such an attitude has serious
implications not only for American foreign capital investors, but also
for the Third World nations which so desperately rely on them for their
most basic developmental needs.
D. HIC's Expectations
The Hester court's ultimate conclusion is also flawed in its failure
to consider HIC's subjective intentions at the time it entered into the
Bansara Rice Project. 4 The Fifth Circuit is quick to point out that the
stipulation in the Bansara agreement that Nigeria would provide an
adequate guarantee was not given by the Federal Republic of Nigeria -
in essence, Nigeria was not directly involved in the agreement in any
way. Rather, it was NGPC and Cross River, HIC's partners in the
Bansara Rice Farms, Ltd., who were responsible for the presence of
this provision. Nevertheless, the provision was included in the agree-
ment, and regardless of who proposed it, it is necessary to determine
what effect this particular stipulation had on HIC's decision to enter
into the agreement.
It is no secret that large capital investments in developing coun-
tries are risky ventures at best.65 And as this case illustrates, they are
potentially disastrous. Consequently, no rational corporate investor
would jeopardize a substantial portion of its assets without taking every
available precaution. Host nations often guarantee debt obtained by a
foreign investor in order to reduce the risk of such investment. This
mechanism is wholly logical: since a host nation is most likely to derive
a substantial benefit from the foreign investment, it should bear its fair
64. See supra note 5.
65. "Despite the tentative signs of improving relations between the U.S and the
Third World, tensions will not soon disappear. Feelings of economic nationalism con-
tinue to run high in the developing countries. And foreign investors will likely find the
terms for investment tighter than they would like." McClenahen, A Welcome Mat For
U.S. Investment?, Industry Week, March 8, 1982 at 89. As a further acknowledgement
of the political and economic risks of large scale investments in Third World nations,
many U.S. firms are turning to the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC)
to help them reduce and/or insure against such risks. Id.
1990]
246 MD. JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW & TRADE [Vol. 14
share of the burden of risk.
Although HIC certainly dealt with limited liability ventures in its
usual course of business and was undoubtedly familiar with the impli-
cations of doing so, each company and each case must be evaluated
within its own specific circumstances. It is not far-fetched to imagine
that HIC did not consider NGPC to fall under the common definition
of a domestic corporate entity. As discussed previously, the socio-eco-
nomic climate of Nigeria places the "corporate entity" in a different
context - one whose "veil" should be pierced more readily. The regard
to be afforded a parastatal entity such as the NGPC should take into
account the pervasive customs in Nigeria. Among such customs is the
tendency of public decision makers at all levels to accept substantial
economic considerations from foreign and local firms in exchange for
the award of a contract, allocation of public housing or use rights, or
non-enforcement of a law or regulation."6 The operation of such "cus-
toms" and HIC's participation within such a climate lends support to
the argument that HIC had reason to believe it was not dealing with a
"corporation" in the American domestic context. Furthermore, the fact
that the security provision was included in writing in the agreement
strengthens this argument.6 7
The final prong of this expectations argument involves analyzing
the concept of apparent authority. "Agency" and "apparent authority"
are legal terms of art which must be considered carefully with a high
degree of attention given to specific facts and the particular context.
The presence of the political subdivision of Cross River was a crucial
factor in Hester."8 Although Nigeria never directly bestowed agency on
Cross River through written or spoken word, the mere act of creating
this political subdivision can be construed as a manifestation of author-
ity. Furthermore, it was well-known by all the parties involved in the
Hester case that NGPC was created and wholly owned by the Federal
Republic of Nigeria. The Hester court's attempt to argue that the
Nigerian government was "uninvolved" in the underlying agreement is
misguided.6 9 In a nation like Nigeria, the act. of creating an agricul-
66. KOEHN, supra note 3, at 273.
67. Obviously, the Nigerian government never refuted the written agreement (un-
til the litigation at hand) which they undoubtedly were familiar with due to their con-
tact with the NGPC board. Although this does not make for conclusive law, it is some-
what dispositive of Nigeria's frame of mind at the time of the formation of Bansara
Rice Farms, Ltd. This seems to represent a knowingly deceptive business practice.
68. See supra note 4.
69. Hester, 879 F.2d at 178-79.
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tural corporation is so monumental"0 that the government cannot be
completely removed from any subsequent transaction entered into by
that instrumentality. Had the Fifth Circuit taken this broad perspec-
tive, they would have concluded that HIC was, in fact, an agent of
Nigeria.
V. IMPLICATIONS OF THE HESTER RULING
This case presents an extremely relevant topic in light of the cur-
rent economic development in the international arena. Numerous un-
derdeveloped countries are in need of American capital to help finance
the implementation of major projects and support the growth and de-
velopment of their infrastructures. Implicit in these investment schemes
is the participation of international development corporations such as
HIC, which often enter into partnerships with enterprises closely linked
to the host developing nations.71
However, the attitude reflected in the Fifth Circuit's opinion in
Hester threatens to stagnate investment in these needy countries. This
decision represents an inclination to transfer the domestic hesitation to
"pierce the corporate veil" into the international market. This is signifi-
cant because there is substantial room for a foreign host government to
take advantage of overseas investors who are restrained by the applica-
tion of their domestic legal principles. Basically, such investors are at
the mercy of the potentially deceptive practices of developing countries
and their governments.72 The only way to avoid such problems and
maintain an amicable foreign investment climate is to encourage the
U.S. courts to approach the issue of "alter ego" status with an open
mind and a view towards the idiosyncratic nature of "corporate" struc-
tures in host Third World countries.
In addition, the Hester opinion opens the door for underdeveloped
70. Due to an agricultural trade deficit, rising food prices and the bleak prospect
of further dependence on Western nations for basic food supplies, Nigeria's Third Na-
tional Development Plan (1975-1980) declared agricultural development as the coun-
try's highest priority. KOEHN, supra note 3, at 86.
71. The benefits of such mechanisms are obvious:
[P]ublic enterprise, largely in the form of development corporations, has be-
come an essential instrument of economic development in the economically
backward countries which have insufficient j rivate venture capital to develop
the utilities and industries which are given priority in the national develop-
ment plan. Not infrequently, these public development corporations. . . di-
rectly or through subsidiaries, enter into partnerships with national or foreign
private enterprises, or they offer shares to the public.
FRIEDMAN, supra note 10, at 333, 334.
72. See supra notes 61-63 and 66-67 and accompanying text.
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governments to practice these deceptive tactics. In essence, foreign gov-
ernments will be able to maintain the shield of the corporate form so
long as they avoid the appearance of controlling day-to-day operations
as specified by Hester's strict adherence to Kal-Spice and Bancec. Con-
sequently, a government like the Federal Republic of Nigeria is practi-
cally rewarded (and protected) for continuing its system of illicit con-
tacts, informal procedures, corruption and bribes so long as they avoid
crossing the bright line of "direct control" as it is defined in American
corporate law.
Although the Commercial Activity Exception 73 of FSIA purports
to protect the rights of the American investors in such developing coun-
tries, it is limited in the sense that it cannot take effect if the foreign
governments are allowed to hide behind their ill-conceived "corporate
agencies."
VI. CONCLUSION
Hester International Corporation v. Federal Republic of Nigeria
is not a landmark case by any stretch of the imagination. In fact, the
Fifth Circuit acted well within its official bounds in finding that HIC's
claim against Nigeria lacked jurisdiction based on the theory that
NGPC was a separate juridical entity. In short, the opinion can be de-
scribed as "legally sound". However, in light of our dynamic interna-
tional market, the opinion serves to warn the legal community of the
potential danger in retaining the traditional rules of the domestic cor-
porate entity in the global context.
The U.S. judicial system must begin to recognize the inherent dif-
ferences between domestic government-corporate relationships and
those which exist in the foreign market place. Despite the judicial un-
willingness to "pierce the corporate veil" in the domestic context, basic
differences in this international arena warrant a different outcome.
To begin with, Hester's strict reliance on the limited principles il-
lustrated by Bancec and Kal-Spice preclude any consideration of the
realities that exist in Third World countries. Such a close-minded atti-
tude threatens the United States' role in assisting these developing
countries. Furthermore, the Hester court ignores the equitable princi-
ples of law that surface in the international context. Basically, Hester
enables Third World countries such as Nigeria to invoke American cor-
porate principles only when it suits their needs. The third, and probably
most egregious flaw in the Hester ruling pertains to the actual political-
legal climate which prevails in Nigeria. Clearly, our domestic corporate
73. See supra note 8.
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law has no application in such an informal and volatile atmosphere.
Finally, the expectations which HIC developed as a result of Nigeria's
business climate and the activities of the Nigerian government demand
a reconsideration of the policies invoked by the Hester court.
Brooke A. Beyer, Jr.

